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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
H. THE NATURE OF THE CASE. 
In March of 1995, recently widowed and 25 year old Tifani Clement (Tifani) met with 
A.G. Edwards agent Gene Gillette (Gillette) about investing life insurance proceeds obtained as a 
result of her husband's death. ' Gillette established "non-tax qualified" annuity insurance 
accounts for Tifani's small children? Tifani and her future husband, Jared Wattenbarger (Jared), 
later discovered that the accounts contained severe tax consequences and transfer restrictions if 
funds were withdrawn prior to when the children reached the age of 59% and would have been 
worth much more had the funds been invested as instructed by TifanL3 After A.G. Edwards (now 
Wells Fargo) refused to remedy the problem, Tifani and Jared brought an action in District 
~ o u r t . ~  A.G. Edwards has yet to answer the allegations and instead moved the court to remove 
the action to arbitration based on an arbitration provision found in an entirely separate agreement 
than the annuity insurance  contract^.^ The district court held that a mandatory arbitration 
provision found in an earlier and completely separate IRA contract that Tifani had with A.G. 
Edwards required all disputes between Tifani and AGE be resolved through binding arbitration 
and subsequently dismissed Tifani and Jared's action. Based upon that same contract, the district 
' R. Vol. I, p. 7 
id. 
R. Vol 11. pp. 96, 129 
See Compl. R. Vol. I, pp. 4-15 
R. Vol I. P. 51 
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court awarded A.G. Edwards $15,197.41 attorney fees and costs.6 This appeal addresses the 
court's decision to dismiss the case and its awarding of attorney fees. 
11. THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
On December 20,2007, Jared and Tifani Wattenbarger filed a complaint against A.G. 
Edwards (now "Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC") and Gillette alleging professional malpractice and 
fraud.7 In a September 3,2008, status conference, the Honorable Greg Anderson ordered that the 
plaintiffs request an answer from the defendants or take default judgment.' On October 7,2008, 
the defendants filed a "Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Stay and Compel 
~rbitration."~ The motion relied upon Idaho Rule of Civ Pro 12(b)(l) and (6) for its motion to 
dismiss and I.C. $ 7-902 (of the Uniform Arbitration Act) for its motion to stay and compel 
arbitration.'' The defendants filed affidavits in support of its motion." A hearing was held in 
regard to the motion on December 4,2008, wherein Judge Anderson requested supplemental 
briefs in regard to the "appropriate standard to apply."'* The district court filed a "Memorandum 
Decision" on January 22,2009, granting defendants' motion to dismiss. l 3  On the same day, the 
court filed another "Memorandum Decision" stating in its conclusion that plaintiffs' "claims 
%. Vol. 11, pp. 172, 190, R. Vol. 111, p. 312 
' R. Vo1. I, pp. 4-15 
R. Vol. I, p. I8 
R. Vol. I, pp. 51-52 
lo id. 
R. Vol. I, pp. 54-91 
l2 R. Vol. 11, p. 55 
l 3  R. Vol. 11, p. 172 
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should be submitted to arbitrati~n."'~ On March 5,2009, the plaintiffs filed a "notice of 
appeal. IS 
On February 5,2009, the defendants filed a "Memorandum of Costs, Disbursements and 
Attorneys' Fees" requesting an award of $18,883.91, relying on ldaho Rule oCCiv Pro 54 (d) and 
(e), Idaho statutes and an arbitration clause for its authority.lG 0niipril 6,2009, the court 
awarded the defendants the full requested amount of attorney's fees in the amount of $15,139.41 
and an additional $58.00 in costs as a "matter of right." l7  The court rejected the defendants' 
argument that there was a statutory right to the costs and instead relied entirely on a contractual 
clause as a basis for its ruling.18 On April 8. 2009, the plaintiffs amended their appeal to include 
to challenge the Court's decision awarding fees and 
1x1. FACTS. 
In September of 1994, Tifani Clement's young husband, Shan Clement, died as a result 
of an accident." Tifani was 25 years old at the time, with a and 
expecting another child who was born in " Fortunately, 
l4 R. Vol. 11, p. 190 
R. VOI. 111, pp. 268-270 
l6 R. Vo1. 11, pp. 199-202 
" R. Vol. 111, p. 323 
R. Vol. 111, pp. 312-322 
l9 R. Vo1. 111, p. 325 
20 R. VOI. 11, p. 93 
R. Vol. 11, p. 2 
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Shan had obtained a $200,000 life insurance Sometime during March of 1995, A.G. 
Edwards agent Gillette initiated contact with Tifani to offer services on investing the life 
insurance proceeds?3 
During her meeting with Gilletle, Tifani told GilleMe her desires for the proceeds, 
including an investment of $15,000 for each of her children to be utilized for funding their future 
college education and church missions." Tifani had no experience in investing and relied 
entirely upon Gillelte's experience and knowledge.25 Gillette subsequentljr established a "non 
tax qualified variable and fixed group annuity contract" (Fixed Insurance Annuity) for each of 
the children with an initial deposit of $15,000.2~ Acting upon Gillette's advice, Tifani made an 
additional deposit of $4,000 to these accounts several months later ub 1995.'~ 
To establish the Fixed Insurance Annuities, Gillette had Tifani complete a "new account 
card" for her and each of her ~hildren.2~ She is listed as the cu~ tod ian .~~  The card contains no 
agreement or reference to any agreement regarding arbitrati~n.~' Tifani was also required to 
ZZ R. Vol. I, p. 6 
23 R. Vo1. 11, pp.94-95 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
2"d. 
27 R. VOI. I, p. 8 
28 R. Vol. 11, pp. 95-96,98-100 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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complete and sign an "application" for the Fixed Insurance Annuities (FIAS)?' The application 
lists Tifani as the "annuitant" and "custodian" for her children?' The application contains no 
provision or reference to an arbitration ~lause.3~ The "certificate specifications" received in 
regard to the FIAs list the children as the "annuitants" and Tifani as the 
"participant."34 
The terms and conditions of the FIAs are stated in a document entitled "Flexible Payment 
Deferred Combination Variable and Fixed Croup Annuity Contract ~ o n ~ a r t i c i ~ a t i n ~ . " ~ ~  This 
contract lacks an arbitration clause or requirement for the resolving of disputes, instead stating 
with regard to jurisdiction that: "This contract and all Certificates issued in connection with it 
will be governed by the laws of the jurisdiction where the Contract Application is signed," or 
Idaho in this case.36 
In December of 1999, Tifkni married Jared ~a t t enba r~e r .3~  Tifani and Jared desired to 
merge their respective investments?' Jared's investor reviewed the FIAs, and informed the 
Wattenbargers about the severe restrictions and tax consequences if the annuities were drawn 
j' R. Vol. 11, pp. 102-104 
j2 Id. 
j3 Id. 
j"d. 
j5 R. VOI. 11, pp. 106-107 
36 Id. 
37 R. Vo1. 11, p.96 
38 Id. 
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from prior to urning the age of fifty nine and one half.39 The Wattenbargers 
also learned that had the money been properly invested, that the accounts would have been much 
more valuable.40 
The Wattenbargers obtained counsel who wrote to A.G. Edwards requesting that the 
investment errors be remedied:' After A.G. Edwards rejectetl this request, the Wattenbargers 
filed a complaint in Bonneville County alleging negligence and fraud.42 The defendants did not 
formally answer the allegations, and, after some prodding by the court to answer the allegations, 
instead filed a "Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Stay and Compel ~rbi t ra t ion."~~ In 
support of its motion, the defendants filed an affidavit by ~i l le t te .4~ Attached to the affidavit 
were copies of documents not kept by Gillette or Tifani which apparently until after the initiation 
of the lawsuit were buried deep within the company's microfiche archives in St. Louis, 
These documents included a "New Account Card" for an "IRAISEP Adoption 
"R. Vol. I, pp. 8-9, R. Vol. 11. pp. 96, 127-128 
" R. Vol. I, p. 9 
" Id. 
42 See Plaintiffs Compl. 
43 R. Vol. I. p. 18, R. VOI I. pp. 51-53 
" R. Vol. I, pp. 54-91 
45 Prior to filing this lawsuit, Wattenbargers sent several inquiries to Gene Gillette and A.G. Edwards, one of which 
was for a copy of all records on file at their office. (See Complaint R. Vol. I. p. 10.) In fact, no copies of written 
agreements between the parties including the above-described documents were kept in Gillette's office or were 
sent by A.G. Edwards main office. (Id.) The first time Wattet~bargers became aware of any documents regarding 
the IRA Agreement containing an arbitration provision was in a Feb. 28,2008, letter from defendants' counsel, 
Howard Bumett, two months afier the initiation ofthe lawsuit. (See R. Vol. 111. Pp. 292-296.) Burnett indicates 
that he had "just received" the documents, that these were "scanned" documents from A.G. Edward's main office 
and that he was still awaiting further "background documents" from the company. (Id. at 296) According to the 
"legal services" description notes submitted by Hawley Troxel, counsel received "additional documents" from 
A.G. Edwards after February 28,2008. (Id. at pp. 241-44) It is readily apparent that the records regarding both 
Appellants' Brief 6 
Agreement" (IRA New Account Card) and an "1RAA.G. Edwards (custodian) Self-Directed 
Individual Retirement Account Disclosure Statement and Custodial Agreement" (IRA 
The IRA New Account Card contains handwritten entries, listing "Tifani Clement" as 
"depositor" and ""San Clement" as "primary beneficiary."47 There is a handwritten signature of 
"Tifani Clement" on the document with the handwritten date of March 3 1, 1 993.48 The "amount 
of contribution" is listed as $ 2 5 0 . ~ ~  Tifani vaguely recalled setting up an IRA with A.G. Edwards 
along with her husband Shan prior to his death.50 She had no recollection or knowledge of ever 
receiving or reviewing the IRA Agreement and made no contributions to the IRA ac~ount.~'  
The new account card states that it is an "IRA Adoption Agreement" and references a: 
binding and enforceable arbitration provision on page 21 in paragraph 12 of Article XI1 
of the Custodial Account ~~reement . "  
The first line of page one of the IRAAgreement declares the following: 
The Disclosure Statement is a general review of the basic rules and federal tax 
considerations regarding your A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. Individual Retirement Account. 
(emphasis added.)53 
the IRA and Fixed Insurance Annuity accounts were not known or ever referred to by the parties involved, and 
required an extensive archival search to find. 
" R. VOI. I, pp. 62-92 
" R. Val. I. p. 63 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 R. Vol. I, p. 94 
5' Id. 
52 R. Val. I, p. 63 
53 R. Val. I, p. 66 
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Page 15 of the IRAAgreeinent is a "Custodial Account Agreement" with the following preface: 
This Agreement is entered into by and between each individual who executes an 
Adoption Agreement (attached hereto) incorporating this Agreement (the "Depositor") 
and A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. (the "Custodian") . . . 
The Depositor desires to establish an individual retirement account (the "account") as 
described in section 408(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended or any 
successor statute ("the Code"). (Emphasis added)54 
Of critical note, the IRA Agreement places quotations around "account" indicating that 
any reference to "account" in the document is a specific reference to "an individual retirement 
account as described in section 408(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19~6."'~ The entire 27 
page IRA Agreement, including the "Custodial Account Agreement" sets forth the rules, 
procedures, rights, etc ... administering the IRA account established by A.G. Edwards pursuant to 
Section 408 of the Internal Revenue Code. No other types of accounts are addressed or even 
referenced in the 
Paragraph 13, Article XII, of the IRA Agreement (not paragraph 12 as indicated in the 
IRA New Account Card) contains the following: 
The Depositor agrees and, by carrying any account for the Depositor, the Custodian 
agrees that all controversies between the Depositor and the Custodian or any of the 
Custodian's present or former officers, directors, agents or em loyees which may arise 
for any cause whatsoever, shall be determined by arbitration. 57 
*". Vol. I, p 80 
55 Note the distinction of quotations between "account" and "the code" (referencing the IRS code section.) The 
quotations are around both "the" and code," whereas "account" is the only tern in quotations, not "the account." 
56 Id. 
" R. Val. I, p. 86 
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The paragraph further states: 
At least one oftlie arbitrators appointed to hear any controversy to be settled by 
arbitration shall be currently en~ployed full time by a member organization of the New 
York Stock Exchange, Inc., unless otherwise agreed in writing prior to the time of the 
arbitsation. 
This arbitration provision shall apply to any controversy or claim or issue in any 
controversy arising froin events which occurred prior,'on or subsequent to h e  execution 
of this arbitration agreement. This arbitration provision shall be interpreted according to 
federal law and the Federal Arbitration Act. The award of the arbitrators, or the majority 
of them, shall be final, and judgment upon the award rendered may be entered into any 
court, state or federal, having j~sisdiction.~~ 
In regard to attorney fees the IRAAgreement states the following in paragraph 10 of Article XII: 
Any expense, including attorney's fees, incurred by the Custodian in defense in an action 
brought by the Depositor seeking rescission of any agreement between the Depositor and 
the Custodian or to recover damages for the activities of the Custodian or its agents or 
employees in handling any account of the Depositor shall be borne solely by the account, 
or the Depositor as the case may be, should the Custodian prevail.59 
On the final page (27) of the IRAAgreement, the document indicates that: "A.G. 
Edwards & Sons, Inc. has adopted the foregoing instrument this 3 lSt day of December 1988 by:" 
an illegible handwritten signature.60 There also appears "ATTEST:" followed by an illegible 
At the bottom of the page is the statement: "Reprinted June 15, 1992."~' There are 
no references in the IRA Agreement to Tifani Clement or the IRA New Account 
58 id. 
59 R. Vol I, p. 85 
60 R. Vol. 1, p. 92 
6' Id. 
62 Id. 
63 R. Vol. I, pp. 63-92 
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I[$SUES PmSENTED ON APPEAL 
The District Court erred regarding its January 22,2009, Memorandum Decisions Re: 
Motion to Dismiss Or, in the Alternative, to Stay and Compel Arbitration. 
a. The District Court esred in applying the wrong rule under an Idaho Rule Civ Pro 
12(b) motion for determining whether Jared and Tifani Wattenbarger had 
contsaclually agreed under the 1993 IRA Agreement to arbitrate tort claims 
arising from separate 1995 FIAs that were entered into on behalf of the children, 
b. The Court improperly found as a matter of law that Tifani and Jared 
Wattenbarger agreed to arbitrate their claims. 
c. The Court improperly found as a matter of law that their tort claims emanating 
from 1995 FIAs that contained no arbitration provisions were subject to, or 
"within the scope" of an arbitration provision arising out of a 1993 IRA 
Agreement; 
d. The Court improperly found as a matter of law that the arbitration clause is not 
unconscionable and invalid for public policy reasons; 
The District Court erred regarding its April 6,2009, Decision Re: Memorandum of Costs, 
Disbursements, and Attorneys' Fees. 
a. In failing to conduct the appropriate analysis under Idaho Rule of Civ Pro 
54(d)(l), the Court failed to cany out its discretionary duties. 
b. The Court errantly or failed to apply the legal standards. 
Appellants' Brief 10 
c. The Court errantly found that there was a contractual basis for recovery of 
attorney fees and costs. 
d. The Court's awarding of costs to Defendant when Defendant has yet to address 
the merits of the case and Plaintiffs claims are still viable but in a different forum 
is unjust and counter to the objectives of Idah6 Rules of Civ Pro. 
e. The Court awarded excessive fees and costs to Defendant. 
Appellants' Brief 1 1 
ARGUMENT 
1. PgEQUESTED RELIEF* 
Pursuant to the arguments below, the appellants request the following relief &om the Court: 
A) that the case be remanded to the district court for the proper consideration of  the facts 
and law under the summary judgment standard, and 
B) i f  the district court finds under a summary judgment standard that the Wattenbargers 
agreed to the arbitration provision in the IRA Agreement, that the district court be further 
instructed that in order for the Wattenbargers' claims to be subject to arbitration that such claims 
must be within the scope of the IRA Agreement, which means that the claims must be related to 
the subject matter o f  and raise some issue the resolution of  which requires reference to or 
construction of  the IRA Agreement itself. 
Or, alternatively, that the Court determine as a matter of law (pursuant to a "de novo" review of  
the facts and law) that either: 
A) the Wattenbargers never contracted to arbitrate their claims, 
B) Wattenbargers' claims are not "within the scope" of  the agreement containing the 
arbitration provision, or 
C) The arbitration clause is invalid for public policy reasons, either for its 
unconscionability or violation of consumer protections. 
Watttenbargers also request that the Court overturn the district court's award of  attorney fees. 
Appellants' Brief 12 
A. A Rule 12@) motion where evidence is presented outside ofthe pleadings is treated 
as a motion for summary judgment and is reviewed "de novo " by the appellate court. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12bPursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Idaho Rule of Civ Pro, 
"If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not 
excluded by the court the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment." See, Losser v. 
Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670,673,183 P.3d 758,761 (2008); Rudzik v Shefleer, 134 Idaho 141,143, 
997 P.2d 602,605 (2000); McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148,151 937 P.2d 1222,1225 (1997). 
The standard of review on an appeal from an order granting summary judgment is the same as 
the standard used by the district court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Caldwell v. 
Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc., 132 Idaho 120,123 968 P.2d 215,218 (1998). In an appeal of ruling 
regarding Rule 12(b)(6) motion supported by evidence, the court "reviews the record before the 
district court, including the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits, if any, to determine 
de novo whether, after construing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
there exists any genuine issues if material fact and whether the successful movant below is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Smith v. US .  R. l? Properties, LC, 141 Idaho 795,798, 
118 P.3d 127, 130, (2005). The appellate court should review the district court's ruling as a 
motion for summary judgment, even if the district court failed to follow summary judgment 
standard of review. Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622,626, 151 P.3d 818,822 (2007) 
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to 
Appellants' Brief 13 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." IDAIHO R. 
OF CIV. 19 56(c); G&MFarnzs v. FunkIrrigation Go., 119 Idaho 514,516-17,808 E42d 851,853- 
54 (1991). When assessing the motion for summary judgment, the court must draw a11 facts and 
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id.) 119 Idaho at 517,808 [92d at 854 ;Sanders v. 
Kuna Joint Sck. Dist., 125 Idaho 872,874,876 P.2d 154, 156'(Ct. App.1994); Haessley v. Safeco 
ntle ins. Co. of Idaho, 121 Idaho 463,825 P.2d 1119 (1992). When assessing a motion for 
summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the non- 
moving party. Dodge-Farrar v. Am. Cleaning Servs., Co., 137 Idaho 838,841,54 P.3d 954,957 
(Ct. App. 2002). 
B. The appellate courd is permitted to exercise a ' y e e  review" oftke law. 
In an appeal, there are no harriers to the court in exercising its own review of the trial 
court's conclusions of law. Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 194, 53 P.3d 121 1, 121 3 (2002). 
Moreover, the Court is "free to draw its own conclusions from the facts presented." BHA Inv. Co. 
v. Idaho, 138 Idaho 348,351,63 P.3d 474,477 (2003) q'ting Kootenai Elec. Coop. v. Washington 
Water Power Co., 127 Idaho 432,435,901 P.2d 1333,1336 (1995). The Court also exercises a 
free review of "matters of law." Ackevman v. Bonneville Couny, 140 Idaho 307, 310, 92 P.3d 
557,560 (2004). Included in its free review are rulings regarding whether the court lacks 
jurisdiction. State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619,621, 115 P.3d 710,712 (2005). 
111. THE DHSTIRBCT COURT FAILED TO PERCEWIE ITS HPEVIEW OF THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS AS A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION. 
During the course of the proceedings the district court requested supplemental 
Appellants' Brief 14 
proceedings in regard to the "appropriate standard to apply." 64 Wattenbargers' supplemental 
brief advised the Court of its duty under Idaho Rule of Civ Pro 12(b) that when "matters outside 
of the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall he treated as one 
for summary judgment . . . ."65 The court rejected this authority by improperly citing language 
from Lovey v. Xegence Blueshield qfdaho, 139 Idaho 37,72 P.3d 877 (2003). 66 The district 
court incorrectly stated that under Lovey "any factual findings in determining arbitrahility (sic) 
must be supported by substantial and competent evidence." (citing Lovey at 41 and 881.) In fact, 
the citation from Lovey states: "When reviewing an unconscionability determination made by the 
trial court, we must accept the factual findings made by the trial court, as long as they are 
supported by substanifad, competent evidence." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the authority cited 
by the court has no bearing on the standard of review. 
Thus, the district court did no analysis pursuant to the summary judgment standard in its 
review. It is necessary for this Court to correct this error. Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622, 
626, 151 P.3d 818,822. Although this appeal is primarily based on matters of law, there are 
critical disputed factual issues that if construed under the summary judgment standard generate 
triable issues about the existence of an agreement to arbitrate the subject claims. Goodman v. 
Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622,626, 151 P.3d 81 8, 822. This Court should vacate and remand this case 
" See December 4,2008, Minute Ently, R. Vol. 11 p.156 
65 See Plaintiffs Supp. Brief dated December 11, 2008, R. Vol. I1 p. 167 
66 See Jan. 22,2009, Mern. Dec., R. Vol. II p. 176 
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because the district court improperly perceived its r0le.6~ 
The critical controverted facts are as follows : 1. Tifani Wattenbarger had no recollection 
or knowledge ofthe IRA Agreement containing the arbitration provision.68 2. A.G. Edwards and 
Gillette had no knowledge of the documents purporting to require arbitration until they were 
"found" in a scanned archive after the complaint had been filed.69 3. The actual document 
containing the arbitration clause is contained within a separate document (IRA Agreement) from 
the IRANew Account Card bearing Tifani's name.7o 4. The IRAAgreement has no reference 
whatsoever to Tifani or the IRANew Account ~ a r d . ~ '  5. Although the IRANew Account Card 
makes reference to a "Custodial Account Agreement" and references a "binding and enforceable 
arbitration provision on page 21 in paragraph 12 of Article XI1 of the Custodial Account 
the actual "binding and enforceable" arbitration provision is found in paragraph 
13. This raises the distinct possibility that the document referred to in the IRA New Account 
Card and which the defendants based their entire motion to dismiss and compel was in actuality 
not produced as evidence in Court, and may in fact no longer exist. If there is even a possibility 
that this is true, the dismissal should be vacated. 
There are myriad factual issues that the district court failed to recognize as material and 
67 It is unclear from the district court's decisions if it in fact recognized that summary judgment standards applied in 
this case. 
68 R. Vol. 11, p. 94 
69 R. Vol. I. p. 6, R. Vol. 111, pp. 292.296 
70 See generally the IRA Agreement 
71 Id. 
" See IRA New Account Card, R. Vol. I, p. 63 
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in dispute. Whether the parties had in,fact agreed to arbitration is a factual issue that the district 
court should have recognized required determination pursuant to a summary judgment standard. 
I&: THE DISTRICT COURT 1MPWBPERTB;BT APPLIED LOVEY K REGENCE BLUE 
SHIELD OF IDABO 
The bulk of the district court decision rests on the side-stepping the holdings of the 
leading Idaho case in regard to the enforceability and scope of arbitration agreements, Lovey v. 
Regence Blueshield ofIdaho, 139 Idaho 37,72 P.3d 877.73 The Lovey court engages in a rather 
detailed analysis of what claims "arising out of or relating to" a contract with an arbitration 
clause is subject to arbitration. Id Howeve< the district court avoids this analysis by pointing out 
a distinction between the arbitration language reviewed in Lovey and the language found the IRA 
Agreement. The Court rationalizes that because the words "out of or relating to" the agreement 
do not appear in the IRA Agreement arbitration clause, the scope as defined by Lovey does not 
apply, and therefore every conceivable case or controversy that could ever occur between 
Wattenbargers and the defendants or their agents - before or after the inception of the IRA 
Agreement infinitem is subject to arbi t ra t i~n.~~ 
Although the IRA Agreement does not contain the exact wording of the clause analyzed 
in Lovey, the language in the respective clauses is essentially the same. Both the express and 
implied terms of the IRA Agreement itself and its governing statute, as well as public policy 
considerations, do limit the scope of the arbitration clause. As detailed below, it is abundantly 
73 See Jan. 22,09, Mem. Dec. R. Vol. I1 pp. 176-191 
74 Id. 
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clear that the scope of arbitration is not boundless as the district court suggests. 
A. The terms oftke IRA Agreement itselflimit the claims subject to arbilration to those 
arising,fi.om the "carrying" ofthe IRA "accounts. " 
The initial task in considering a motion to compel arbitration is to determine 1) whether 
the parties agreed to arbitrate and 2) the scope of that agreement. Amodio v Blindec Robinson & 
Co., 71 5 F. Supp 32,33 (D. Conn. 1989). Arbitration "is a matter of contract and a party cannot 
be required to submit to arbitration of any dispute he has not agreed so to submit." Howsam v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Znc., 537 U.S. 79, 82 (2002) q'ting Steelworks v. Warrior & GzalfNav. 
Co., 363 U.S. 574,582 (1960). In determining the scope ofthe contract, the court should 
consider "the circumstances under which the agreement was made." Efund Capital Partners v. 
Robert Pless, 150 Cal. App. 4" 131 1, 1322 (Cal. App. 2007) The court must also ascertain 
whether the party seeking arbitration is "making a claim on which its face is governed by the 
parties contract." Mason v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 177 P.3d 944,948 (2007)(emphasis 
added). "Whether an arbitration clause in a contract requires arbitration of a particular dispute or 
claim depends on its terms." Id. (emphasis added) 
Even if Tifani agreed to arbitrate IRA disputes, the IRA Agreement and its arbitration 
only pertains to A.G. Edwards's administration of the IRA accounts established for its customer, 
therefore limiting the claims that would be subject to arbitration. Page 1 of the IRAAgreement 
clearly limits its scope, stating that it is: 
a general review of the basic rules and federal tax considerations regardin your A. G. 
Edwards & Sons, Inc. Individual Retirement Account. (emphasis added.) IW 
R. Vol. I, p. 66 
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The entire 27 page IRA Agreement and the "'Custodial Account Agreement" limits its 
application to IRA accounts under "Section 408 of the Internal Revenue Code."'" The 
agreement does not contemplate any other type of accounts. In fact, "account" is defined on 
Page 15 as "an individual retirement account as described in section 408(a) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended or any successor statute ("the   ode")."'^^ 
The IRA Agreement's use of quotations around "account" indicates that any reference to 
"account" in the document is a specific reference to a Section 408(a) IRA account. The fact that 
the quotations are around "account" and not "the account" (as is the case with "the code") 
suggests that "account" as referenced in the document refers to the possibility of one or more 
"individual retirement accounts as described in section 408(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986" and not other types of accounts for which there is no definition of in the agreement. 
At the very least, the fact that quotations are around the article "the" in "the code" and 
not the article "the" in the "account" suggests an ambiguity because the quotation marks are 
"reasonably subject to conflict in its interpretation." Badell v. Badell, 122 Idaho 442,449,835 
P.2d 677, 684 (1 992). Ambiguities in a contract are construed against the drafter, which in this 
case is A.G. Edwards. Morgan v, Firestone 1;:re & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506,201 P.2d 976 
(1948) Therefore, even if the quotation marks are ambiguous, construing the ambiguity against 
the drafter, the word ''account" as it appears in the document refers to one or more Section 
'*' See general IRA Agreement 
Is2 R. VOI. I, p. 80 
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408(a) IRA accounts as defiIled on page 15 of the agreement. 
Hence, the first line of Paragraph 13, Article XII, found on page 2 1 of the IRAAgreement 
- of which the defendants based their entire motion states the following: 
The Depositor agrees and, by carrying any account for the Depositor, the Custodian 
agrees that all controversies behveen the Depositor and the Custodian or any of the 
Custodian's present or former officers, directors, agents or employees which ma arise 
for any cause whatsoever, shall be determined by arbitration. (emphasis added) IY3 
The key phrase in this provision is "by carrying any account (defined as IRA account) for 
the Depositor" which establishes the scope of this arbitration provision and therefore the 
limitation of the claims subject to arbitration. This reference to the "carrying of any (IRA 
account)" combined with the singular references throughout the document to Section 408(a) 
lRAs has essentially the same meaning as "arising from or relating to" the contract. In 
considering the plain meaning of the its terms and the circumstances under which the document 
was agreed to, there is no other reasonable interpretation of the document and its provisions other 
than that it relates exclusively to IRA accounts - as suggested by its very title: "IRA A.G. 
Edwards (custodian) Self-Directed Individual Retirement Account Disclosure Statement and 
Custodial ~~reemen t . " "~  Efund Capital Partners v. Robert Pless, 150 Cal. App. 4" 13 11, 1322 
Under this interpretation of the IRA Agreement, even under the broad parameters of 
Lovey the scope of the arbitration provision ends with claims, including torts, that do not involve 
the "carrying" of Tifani's IRA accounts withA.G. Edwards. The Lovey court states that the 
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scope of the arbitration clause depends "on the relationship of the claim to the subject matter of 
the arbitration clause" and at a minimum must "raise some issue the resolution of which requires 
reference to or construction of the contract itself." Lovey, 139 Idaho at 47, 72 P.3d at 887.15' 
Wattenbargers' claims have nothing whatsoever to do with the IRA accounts, "the subject 
matter" of the arbitration provision, nor to the IRAAgreement or "contract itself." Id. In fact, the 
claims involved FIAs entered into through a separate and distinctly different new account card, 
separate applications, and controlling documents none of which contain any arbitration 
provisions or reference lo any previous agreements, including the ~ ~ ~ ~ g r e e m e n t . ' ~ ~  
Moreover, A.G. Edwards does not "carry" the annuities. Although A.G. Edwards 
established the annuities, the annuities are managed or "carried? by Sun Life Assurance, 1r1c.l~~ 
Thus, even if the definition of "account" is not restricted to IRAaccounts, the arbitration 
provision still does not apply because the account that is the subject matter of the Wattenbargers' 
claims is not "carried" by A.G. Edwards. 
15' In it's Jan. 22,2009, decision, the district court errantly refers a California case cited in Lovey as Idaho's 
"adoption" that if the confract merely "creates a relationship" then the arbitration provision applies to all future 
claims between the parties. Again, the district court fails to correctly or fully cite the Lovey decision. Lovey 
makes it clear later on it its decision that a relationship creation is not enough, but that the claim must be least bear 
some relationship to the "subject matter" of the contract and it must "at a minimum, raise some issue the 
resolution of which requires reference to or construction of some portion of the contract itself." (as cited above) 
Is' see the exhibits to aff. of Tifani Wattenbarger, R. Vol. 11, pp. 98-1 10 
lS7 11. R. VOI. pp. 106-107. This makes the district court's analysis that much more suspect. In fact, the annuity 
contract at issue is ultimately with a third party. In an even more sophistic twist, the district court then uses this 
third party contractual relationship to deny a pledge of the annuity in lieu of a bond 011 appeal, because A.G. 
Edwards purportedly has no control over the funds. 
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B. The governing statute of the arbitration clause, the Federal Arbitration Act, expressly 
provides that arbitration clauses are only enforceable for claims "arising under the 
contracI.' 
The arbitration clause in this case is to be '"nterpreted according to federal law and the 
Federal Arbitration Act." (FAA) 2 USCS $ 1, et al. The FAAprovides: 
A writlen provi.sion in . . . a contract. . . to settle by arbitration a controversy thereajer 
arising out of such contract. . ..shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceuble, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (emphasis 
added) 9 USCS $ 2 
The statute is explicit that a "valid" or "enforceable" arbitration clause is a 'k i t ten 
provision in . . . a contract. . . to settle by arbitration a controversy thereajer arising out of such 
contract."'58 Id. Thus, by law, such clauses are only valid or enforceable for claims which "arise 
out of the contract" that contains them. 
Consistent with this interpretation, Federal courts have indicated that arbitration clauses 
found within a contract are not "independent contracts." Such an analysis is contained within a 
Sixth Circuit decision Glazer v Lehmen Bros., Inc., 394 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 2005). In referencing 
several previous decisions including from the U.S. Supreme, the Court concludes that although 
an arbitration clause can be considered separately in terms of enforceability, the clause is not an 
"independent contract" nor should be "considered a separate contract" from the contract in which 
it is contained. Id. at 453-54. 
Accordingly, courts have consistently held when two separate contracts exist, one which 
15' The term "maritime transaction" and its references in the section are omitted because they does not apply to the 
facts of this case 
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contains an arbitration clause and one which does not, the contract which contains the arbitration 
does not control claims "arising out of' of the contract which does not contain the arbitration 
clause. See Battaglia v. McKendry, 233 F.3d 720, 727 (3d Cir. 2000)(holding that consulting 
agreement and settlement agreements were independent agreements and therefore the arbitration 
agreement in the settlement agreement could not be applied to claims arising from the consulting 
agreement). See also Alticor Inc. I/: Nut '1 Union Fire Ins. Co. qfpittsburgh, PA, 41 1 F.3d 669 (6' 
Cir. 2005) (holding that an arbitration provision in an ancillary agreement to an insurance policy 
could not enforced to a claim regarding an "occurrence" under the insurance agreement.) 
In this case, although the arbitration clause in the IRAAgreement does not contain 
"arising out of," as interpreted by the FAA, the arbitration clause is only enforceable as to claims 
that "arise out of'  the IRAAgreement. This would not include claims arising out of different 
contract even though it may involve some of the same parties. See Battaglia v. McKendry, 233 
F.3d 720, 727 See, al.~oAlticor, 41 1 F.3d at 669. Wattenbargers' claims arise out of FIAs 
contracts, thus the IRA Agreement arbitration provision does not apply. Further, the defendants 
cannot claim that the arbitration clause was a "separate" or "independent" contract than the IRA 
Agreement. See Glazer v Lehmen Brothers, Inc., 394 F.3d 444 The arbitration provision is part of 
the IRA Agreement, that's all. The Wattenbargers' claims in regard to the FIAs do not "arise" out 
of the IRAAgreement. They arise out of a separate contract and set of circumstances. 
C. That the arbitration clause should apply to claims arising out of the contract is an 
implied term. 
This Court has recognized that "a contract includes not only what is stated expressly but 
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also that which of necessity is implied from its language." Scott 12 Castle, 104 Idaho 719,723, 
662 P.2d 1163, 1167 (61. App. 1983). As .further explained, there is a "general rule of contract" 
that "terms are to be implied in a contract, not because they are reasonable, but because they are 
necessarily involved in the contractual relationship so that the parties must have intended them 
and have only failed to express them because of sheer inadveizence or because they axe too 
obvious to need expression." Star Phoenix Mining Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 130 Idaho 223,231, 
939 P.2d 542,550 (1997). Such implied terms "arise from the specific circumstances under 
which the contract was made." Id. Further, these "implied terms are as much a part of the 
contract as those which are expressed." Id. 
In this case, given that the IRAAgreement deals entirely with IRA Accounts managed by 
A.G Edwards, it should be easily or "obviously" implied that the arbitration provision within that 
agreement would apply to claims arising from that agreement. Id. The fact that the arbitration 
clause is to be "interpreted" according to the FAA which, as previously discussed, enforces 
arbitration agreements for controversies "arising out of'  the contract is further implication that 
the clause applies only to the IRA Agreement. Id. The circumstances surrounding the IRA 
Agreement was that Tifani had agreed to establish an IRA account with A.G Edwards, and that 
the documents contained the governance and administrative procedures for that account. By 
implication, all of the terms within those documents relate solely to the IRA. Again, the scope of 
both the "express" and "implied" telms of the contract including its arbitration do not cover 
Wattenbargers' claims and their appeal should therefore be granted. 
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D. The district court erred in holding that Jared Walfenbarger agreed to arbitrate the 
claims. 
The district c o w  held that Jared Wattenbarger is subject to the arbitration provision that 
he did not sign, citing cases under the principles of agency where spouses cannot escape liability 
because the other spouse signed the agreement. However, the facts in this matter are 
dramatically difterent than the cases cited by the district court. In March of 1993,Qfani was not 
married to Jared. To this point, Wattenbargers have not been able to find any "spousal agency" 
cases under these extraordinary set of facts - i.e., can a woman married at the time of an 
agreement bind a future spouse to that agreement, particularly if the woman does not yet know 
the spouse that she would be binding in the future? This may therefore be a case of first 
impression for the Court. Iiowever, it stands to reason that agency should not reach that far into 
the futwe, and Tifani had no express or apparent authorization to bind a future husband. Thus 
Jared, whatever his claims might be, is not bound by the arbitration agreement. 
V. THE AmITIPthIFION CLAUSE ]IS INVALID AS A MATTER OF PUBLlC 
POLICY. 
A. The arbitration clause as interpreted without limitation is unconscionable. 
Both the defendants and the district court have construed the arbitration clause to literally 
cover each and every possible "controversy, claim or issue" between Tifani and any current or 
former "employee" or "agent" 0fA.G. Edwards arising "prior" or "subsequent" to the 1993 
agreement.'59 One of the arbitrators must be a member of the New York Stock Exchange, 1nc.160 
The District Court's Jan. 22 2009, R. Vol 11. pp. 178 states that the arbitration clause: "requires that all litigation 
arising from any event between A.G. Edwards and Tifani be arbitrated." 
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The breadth of this arbitration clause is staggering and on its face unconscionable, against public 
policy and should be invalidated. 
In Idaho, for a contractual provision to be voided as unconscionable, it must be both 
procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Procedural unconscionability relates to the 
bargaining process leading to the to the agreement while substantive unconscionability focuses 
upon the terms of the agreement itself. Zovey v. Regence Blueshield ofIdaho, 139 Idaho 37,42, 
72 P.3d 777,882 The elements of procedural unconscionability are laid out in the Lovey: 
Procedural unconscionability may arise when the contract "was not the result of free 
bargaining between the parties.". . . Indicators of procedural unconscionability generally 
fall into two areas: lack of voluntariness and lack of knowledge. Lack of voluntariness 
can be shown by factors such as the use of high-pressure tactics, coercion, oppression or 
threats short of duress, or by great imbalance on the parties' bargaining power with the 
stronger party's terms being nonnegotiable and the weaker party being prevented by 
market factors, timing, or other pressures from being able to contract with another party 
on more favorable terms or to refrain from contracting at all. Lack of knowledge can be 
shown by iaclc of understanding regarding the contract terms arising from the use of 
inconspicuous print, ambiguous wording, or complex legalistic language, the lack of 
opportunity to study the contract and inquire about its terms, or disparity in the 
sophistication, knowledge, or experience of the parties, (citations omitted) Id. 
The district court correctly stated these elements of procedural unconscionability found in 
Lovey in its decision. However, instead of applying the elements directly to the facts of this case, 
the Court instead compared the analysis of the facts of the Lovey case with the facts of the 
current ca~e ." '~ '  Recognizing that each case presents its own set of unique circumstances and 
facts, the Court should have conducted a review of the specific facts and circumstances regarding 
R. Vol. I. p. 21 
16' See the court's analysis, R. Vol. 11, pp. 183-185 
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the bargaining position of the parties in the current case as applied to the elements of procedural 
unconscionability. 
The district court while ostensibly noting that this case involves an "adhesion contract" 
between the parties, it dismissed that factor almost out of hand. While the factor of an adhesion 
contract does not by itself result in '"rocedural unconscionability," it certainly covers one key 
element that of an unequal or "imbalanced" bargaining position between the parties. Obviously, 
as a young widow with no experience, Tifani was in a much weaker bargaining position than a 
major corporation in A.G. Edwards. 
The facts supporting the reasons why the bargaining process was unconscionable are 
compelling. Continually ignored by both the defendants and the district coust is that the basis for 
the Wattenbargers' claims is not the 1993 interactions with Mr. Gillette, or the IRAAgreement, 
but rather the annuities transaction and contract that took place more than two years later. At the 
time that Tifani filled out and signed the paperwork establishing the FIAs for her children, there 
was no oral or written disclosure that the particular contracts would be subject to an arbitration 
provision in a different unrelated contract that she may or may have not signed two years 
previously. In fact, the arbitration requirement was not even within A.G. Edward's 
contemplation at the time the annuities were created.'62 Tifani had no "opportunity" at the time 
she agreed to set up the annuities to study the arbitration provision as it would have related to the 
16' The efforts to which A.G. Edwards had to go simply to find the arbitration provision afrer Tifini filed suit 
demonstrate conclusively that there was absolutely no disclosure of the arbitration requirement at the time she 
entered into the annuity contracts 
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annuities. Lovey at 42. Moreover, absolutely nothing in the annuity agreements would have 
even put her on notice that there was a second, unrelated agreement requiring arbitration of the 
agreements she was about to enter. Thus the arbitration language was beyond "inconspicuous," 
it was non-existent. Id. 
Apropos Tifani's inability to review the arbitration requirement "incorporated into" the 
annuity agreements, the defendants allege as to the 1993 IRA Agreement that the arbitration 
1 
I provision found on page 21 of an "IRA Disclosure Statement . . ." attached to an "IRA Adoption 
I 
Agreement" applies to conduct and controversies beyond the handling of the IRA. Stitching 
together these numerous documents into a tapestry requiring arbitration is something entities Iilce 
A.G. Edwards have become expert at to the detriment of all consumers, not just Tifani. This is 
I 
I not simply a "complex" provision in a "standardized" document, it is simply designed to 
! 
mislead consumers. Tifani would have expected the documents accompanying the agreement 
! 
that she was signing to he about the subject matter for which she was bargaining, not something 
else. That the district court would be complicit in enforcing this type of "agreement" is 
profoundly disturbing. 
Finally, Tifani's total lack of experience and kuowledge in investing should not be 
disregarded. Neither should the Court ignore the fact that Tifani, understandably, had no recall 
of any such arbitration agreement. Apparently neither did anyone from A.G. Edwards, again, 
apparent from the fact that this arbitration cIause was not located or "found" until after the 
lawsuit was initiated. 
In totality, the bargaining process in regard to the IRA Agreement arbitration clause - as 
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it is being applied to the FIAs contracts and all other potential controversies was unfairly and 
heavily tilted against Tifani. In fact, a court would have to engage in fictions to conclude that 
there was any type of "bargaining" process at all. It was an obscure if not deceptive provision 
with major ramifications that Tifani had no real opportunity to understand or bargain for - 
particularly in regard to future contracts. This typifies procedural unconscionability. 
The district court's analysis stops after procedural unconscionability and thus 
"substantive unconsvionability" now must be taken up the appellate court. The Lovey Court lays 
out its elements as follows: 
The contract or provision is substantively unconscionable if it is a bargain that no person 
in his or her senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand and that no 
honest and fair pelson would accept on the other. Id. Factors to consider include whether 
the contract or provision is one-sided or oppressive. . . .the court must consider the 
purpose and effect of the terms at issue, the needs of both parties and the commercial 
setting in which the agreement was executed, and the reasonableness of the terms at the 
time of contracting.. Id. at 42-43 
The literal effect of the arbitration, as applied to any and every "controversy, claim or 
issue" between Tiiani and virtually anyone associated with A.G. Edwards (now 'Wells Fargo") 
before and after 1993 is a bargain that no one in their right mind would ever accept. Under this 
provision, if a former employee of A.G Edwards were to cause the wrongful death of one of 
Tifani's children, her case would have to go bei'ore arbitration that would include a "member 
organization of the New York Stock Exchange." No person would knowingly deprive 
themselves of this kind of due process and access to the courts. 
In addition, defendants cannot claim that the IRA Agreement arbitration clause applies to 
claims arising from the annuity contracts but not other issues unrelated to the IRA Agreement, or 
Appellants' Brief 29 
in other words try to "qualify" the limitation of the language. This would be inconsistent with 
the position that they have taken in attempting to enforce this arbitration clause. Either the scope 
of the clause is limited to claims arising out of the IRA agreement, or its scope is unlimited - not 
somewhere in between. In fact, the district court adopted the patently absurd position that that 
the provision applies to all controversies and claims arising ffom any "event" between the parties 
without limitation. The defendants and the district court are in error and have supported an 
arbitration clause that is quite evidently unconscionable and therefore invalid as a matter of 
public policy. 
B. The arbitrationprovision is unconscionable as a matter of consumer protection. 
While the courts do favor the enforcement of arbitration agreements, such agreements 
should not be enforced at the expense of consumer protection from deceptive or excessively one- 
sided transactions. The appellate court is allowed to conduct a free review of governing statutes 
of the issues on appeal, including the statute's legislative intent, i.e. the "language used, the 
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the statute." Kelso & Irwin, 
FA. v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 134,997 P.2d 591,595 (2000). 
Idaho's "Consumer Protection Act" bans "Unconscionable Methods, Acts, or Practices." 
I.C. 48-603C. The determination of such unconscionable acts or practices include: 
Whether the alleged violator knowingly or with reason to know, took advantage of a 
consumer reasonable unable to protect his interest because of physical, infirmity, 
ignorance, illiteracy, inability to understand the language of the agreement or similar 
factor. Id. at (2)(a), 
Whether the alleged violator lcnowingly or with reason to know induced the consumer to 
enter into a transaction that was excessively one-sided in favor of the alleged violator. Id. 
Appellants' Brief 30 
at 2(c), and 
Whether the sales conduct or pattern of sales conduct would outrage or offend the public 
conscience as determined by the court. Id. at 2(d) 
This statute refers to conduct that is directed at the consumer and is "designed to exploit a 
particular weakness or disadvantage" of the consumer. Stare v. Daicel Chenz. Indus., LTD., 141 
Idaho 102, 109, 106 P.3d 428,435 (2005). 
Recently, stock arbitration agreements between consumers and large corporations have 
come under increased scrutiny by Congress and consumer protection agencies. The respected 
national, non-profit public interest organization Public Citizen recently published a detailed 
report entitled: "The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers." 
(September 2007, found at http://www.citizen.orgipublications/release.cfm?ID 
=7545&secID=1052&catlD=126). This report documents and details the major advantages that 
corporations have over consumers in the arbitration process, including the secrecy of the 
arbitration proceedings, the financial incentives h t  arbitrators receive from corporations that 
use them, the costs to consumers and the total lack of safeguards to ensure fairness to the 
consumers that would be available in civil court. As a confirmation of these inequities, the report 
found in a study of California arbitration decisions that the consumer prevailed only 3.3% of the 
time. (See p. 16) In response to these concerns, Congress is currently considering the 
"Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009" (S. 93lM.R. 1020) that would prevent arbitration from being 
foisted upon consumers through binding, secret and non-negotiable arbitration clauses. 
In this case, the arbitration clause that the defendants are attempting to impose on 
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Wattenbargers is well within the purview of consumer abuses prohibited under the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act and which are trending to be viewed as unfair and deceptive under 
public policy. This onerous arbitration clause, as interpreted by the defendants and the district 
court, applies to every potential issues or controversy between Tifani and the defendants, 
including the defendants' agents. A.G. Edward's conduct was deceptive and provided no real 
opportunity or ability for Tifani to understand or know the potential ramifications of such a broad 
and wide-ranging agreement. 
Moreover, both in its language and practical application, the arbitration provision stacks 
the cards against Wattenbargers' claims, or is "excessively one sided." The provision requires a 
member of the "New York Stock Exchange, Inc." to sit on the arbitration panel, creating an 
automatic conflict of interest (because the defendants are also a member). In practical terms, the 
Wattenbargers will have only a 3% chance of prevailing in arbitration. They will not have the 
access to due process that is available in civil court and may be before a panel which has a direct 
and pecuniary tie to the defendants. Such disadvantages are evidenced by the major investment 
in legal fees (over $18,000) by the defendants to try and move the claims to arbitration, even 
before they have even filed an answer to the claims. 
In considering the "reasonableness of the interpretation" and the "policy behind "the 
FAA" in concert with the Consumer Protection Act and public trends, this Court should 
invalidate the arbitration clause as unconscionable and against public policy. Kelso & Irwin, PA. 
v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 134,997 P.2d 591,595. Protecting consumers is an important 
responsibility of the court. The defendants' attempted application of the arbitration clause is 
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blatantly unfair to Wattenbargers and should not be upheld. 
WJH. THE DBSTRlCT COURT ABUSED %TS DISCRETION IN AWAmiIWG 
ATTOWEY FEES 
The decision to award any costs to the prevailing party is within the discretion of the 
court. Caldwell v. Idaho Youth Ranch, 132 Idaho 120, 128,968 P.2d 215,223 (1998). 
Accordingly, when the court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate conrt 
considers: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it and (3) whether the court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. Selkirk Seed Co. v. Forney, 134 Idaho 98, 104, 996 P.2d 798, 
804 (2000). 
Although the prevailing party determination is "discretionay in nature, this discretion 
must be exercised within the bounds of governing legal standards," and therefore can be a matter 
of law. Sanders v. Lankford, 134 Idaho 322,326, 1 P.3d 823,827 (2000 Ida. App.). For 
instance, where the lower court must first interpret a contract to determine if attorney fees are 
appropriate before making a discretionary determination as to who is the prevailing party, the 
interpretation of the contract is a question of law over which the appellate court exercises free 
review. Badell v. Badell, 122 Idaho 442,449,835 P.2d 677,684 (Ida. App. 1992). 
A. The District Court failed to perceive the awarding offies as one of discretion 
In awarding the defendants fees, the district court failed to conduct any kind of 
consideration of the required factors in determining whether a party is entitled to fees under 
Idaho Rule of Civ Pro 54(d)(l)(B). 
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The law requires a three factor test in determining whether to award fees: 
(1) The final judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought by the respective 
parties; (2) Whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and 
(3) to the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on each of the claims or issues. 
Nguyen v, Hoa, 193 P.3d 1107, I1 12 (Ida. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Jardine, 130 Idaho 318, 
940 P.2d 1137, 1140 (1997) 
In conducting this analysis, the court must also consi&er "all of the issues involved in the 
action and the judgment or judgments obtained" from an "overall view." Nguyen v. Hoa, 193 
It is apparent that once the district court declared its decision "hal,"' that was all that was 
required in its mind to meet the "prevailing party" standard under the rule, stating: 
Even though the matter has yet been resolved on the merits through arbitration, a final 
judgment has been entered in this action. . . Consequently, defendants are the prevailing 
parties and should be awarded reasonable attorney fees.'63 
As required under the mandatoly three factor test under the rule, the district court did not 
consider the "final judgment obtained" in relation to "the relief sought" by Wattenbargers. 
Indeed, the Wattenbargers have yet to even adjudicate their claims. State v. Jardine, 130 Idaho 
3 18, 940 P.2d 1137, 1140 (1997). Further, the district court failed to examine to the extent that 
each of the parties prevailed on "each" or "all of the issues" and involved in the action and the 
"overall view." Nguyen v. Hoa, 193 P.3d 1107, 11 12, 11 14. There is no such analysis. The 
defendants may have prevailed on switching the forum to arbitration, but they have not prevailed 
on any of Wattenbargers' claims - and have not even answered the allegations. It is readily 
IG3 See April 6,2009, Mem. Dec. R. Vol. 111, pp. 317 
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apparent that the district court simply did not understand its discretionary authority, believing 
that once it determined there was a "final judgment," fees should be automatically awarded. 
Such a truncated analysis is an abuse of its discretion and its award of attorney fees to the 
defendants should be overturned. 
B. The district court jailed to apply or misapplied ttie proper legal standard 
In determining that the defendants obtained a '%a1 judgment" and thus were the 
"prevailing party" the district court failed to follow the law in how to proceed when arbitration 
has been ordered. The FAA states that when there is a suit brought in court, and the court agrees 
that the claims are subject to arbitration, the court shall ''slay the trial of the action until such 
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement." 9 USCS $ 3  The Act 
further states that upon completion of the arbitration, that the prevailing party can then seek 
"judgment of the court." Id. at 5 6. The Courts have made it clear that claimants that are subject 
to arbitration do not forgo their substantive rights afforded by statute. Perez. E Globe Airport 
th . Sec. Servs., Inc. 253 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11 Clr. 2001); Cole a Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 323 U.S. 
App. D.C. 133, 105 F.3d 1465,1487 (Dist. Col. Ct. App. 1997) 
As mentioned previously, the arbitration provision is governed under the FAA. Thus, 
pursuant to Section 3 of that Act, rather than issuing a "final judgment" making the Defendants 
the "prevailing party," the Court should have delayed such judgment, or "stayed the proceeding" 
pending the outcome of the arbitration. Failing to do so has violated Wattenbargers' substantive 
rights under the statute, because it has required them to prematurely suffer the consequences of 
paying the defendants' attorney fees before having even the opporhmity to adjudicate their 
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claims. Perez. v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc. 253 F.3d 1280, 1285 Pulsuant to the FAA, there 
has been no final judgment, and therefore no right to even an analysis of whether defendants 
should he awarded fees under I.R.C.P. 54(b). The district court's decision to award fees was 
premature and should be overturned. 
Further, the legal authority cited by the district court was incorrectly applied to the facts 
of this case. The Court references Daisy Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Paintball Sports, Inc. 134 Idaho, 259, 
261-62,999 P.2d 914,916-17 (Ct. App. 2000) . '~~ In PaintbaN the Plaintiffs case was dismissed 
because they discovered after the action that the defendants were not the "real party in interest." 
The court ultimately awarded the defendants their fees because the "defendants could not have 
achieved a more favorable outcome." Id. The district court compares the defendants in this case 
and the Paintball case, when in fact the results in the two respective cases are entirely different. 
In Paintball the Plaintiffs' claims were entirely extinguished because the defendants were "not 
the real party in interest." However, in this case not only have Wattenbargers' claims against the 
defendants not been terminated by the dismissal of the case, they have yet to be adjudicated. The 
defendants are still very much a "party in interest" in this case. Thus the "most favorable 
outcome" has not been obtained by the defendants, and Painlball does not apply. The district 
court has erred and must be overturned. 
C .  The District Court erred in determining that there M.~US a conmctual basis for the 
warding of fees 
Before fees can be awarded under Idaho Rule of Civ Pro 54(b)-(e) there inust be a 
16' R. Vol. 111, pp. 316-317 
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contractual or statutory basis entitling such fees. Mihalka a Shepard, 145 Idaho 547,550, 181 
T93d 473,476 (2008). The district court rejected the defendants' statutory basis for fees, instead 
relying on the IRA Agreement: 
Any expense, including attorney's fees, incurred by the Custodian in defense in an action 
brought by the Depositor seeking rescission of any agreement between the Depositor and 
the Custodian or to recover damages for the uctivities.ofthe Custodian or its agenis or 
employees in handling any account of the Depositor shall be bo~ne solely by the account, 
or the Depositor as the case may be, should the Custodian prevail. (Emphasis added)165 
The appellate court can review "de novo" whether this contract language does require the 
Wattenbargers to pay attorney fees when all the defendants have accomplished is to compel 
arbitration. Badell v Budell, 122 Idaho 442,449,835 P.2d 677,684 
As discussed, supra, the Wattenbargers' claims are not based on the IRAAgreement. 
Therefore, there is no contractual basis for attorney fees. In any case, the defendants have not 
"prevailed" on the Wattenbargers "action" to "recover damages" for the defendants "activities" 
in "handling" of the accounts. In fact, the "action" has yet to be adjudicated. At best, defendants 
have only succeeded to have the "action" transferred to arbitration, nothing more. In fact, since 
the IRAAgreement contemplates that all disputes are only to be considered through arbitration, 
its language only applies to arbitration procedures. Because arbitration has not occurred, there 
has been no "action" under the contract. The defendants are not entitled to their attorney fees. 
D. The amount offees awarded by the District Court is unreasonable 
Idaho Rule of Civ Pro 54(e)(3) sets forth mandatory a 12 factor test in determining the 
' 65  R. Vol 11, p. 85 
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appropriate amount of attorney fees that should be awarded. With no explanation, the District 
Court accepted "cart blanche" the defendants' request of $15,139,41 in attorney fees. This 
amount seems extraordinarily high for what should have been a straight forward motion on 
whether Wattenbargers had agreed to arbitrate their claims. The defendants' attorneys had 
submitted a 23 page summary of "legal services" dated from January 9,2008 though December 
12,2008. The defendants' "Motion to Dismiss" was not filed until October 10,2008. Even a 
cursory review of these legal services by the Court would have indicated several thousand dollars 
incurred in legal fees over a several month period to 1) research the company files to determine 
exactly what documents existed, 2) engage in lengthy internal conversations and memorandums 
in regard to those files and 3) exhaustive investigation as to whether arbitration provisions in 
these documents were even legally enforceable.16' Approximately $2,500 in fees was incurred 
over a several month period just in the drafting, re-drafting and editing the affidavit of Gene 
~il lette. '~ '  The defendants' extensive "fact finding" and internal communications regard those 
facts should not be a cost covered by the Wattenbargers. In any case, the Court simply failed 
conduct its mandatory analysis about the appropriateness of the award, which should be 
overturned. 
E. The district court's awarding offies is unreasonable and unjust. 
What should not be forgotten in this analysis is the underlying basis for the execution of 
See Bumett Aff. R. Vol. 111, pp. 203-260 
I6l Id. 
Id. 
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any of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, as stated in Rule l(a): 
These mles shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding. Idaho Rule of Civ Pro l(a) 
As this concept of justice applies to the determination of the "right" of a "prevailing party" to be 
awarded costs under 1.R.G.P 54(d), the Court must conduct a "careful consideration of the 
relevant factual circumstances and principles of law, and without arbitrary disregard for those 
kcts and principles of justice." Decker v. Homeguard Sys., 105 Idaho 158, 161 (Ida. App. 1983) 
In awarding fees, the district court has apparently neglected this essential principle of 
justice and efficiency. The Wattenbargers are private citizens, a married couple with limited 
resources who believe that they have legitimate claims against a corporation with almodt 
unlimited resources. They have a right to have those claims heard. The obvious objective of the 
defendants is to use whatever resources necessary to prevent the Wattenbargers from having their 
claims adjudicated in a fair forum or in any forum. The defendants' motion to seek a recovery of 
their fees after only succeeding to have the claims removed to arbitration was nothing short of an 
attempt to create more costs for the plaintiffs to deter them pursuing these claims. 
The district court should have recognized and rejected this ulterior motive and tactics. 
The district court should have also considered the circumstances, including the un-equal position 
of the parties. Instead, the awarding of the fees has left Wattenbargers with no choice but to 
undergo the expensive, time-consuming and arduous appeals process and to pay the defendants, 
including this massive corporation in Wells Fargo their fees even before their claims have been 
heard. This is not the "just, speedy, determination" of proceedings required under Rule 1(A), and 
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is in fact the utter "disregard" Tor the "facts and principles of justice." Decker v. Homegzbard Sys., 
105 Idaho 158, 161. The justice system should be used as a fair and ef6cienl opportunity to 
adjudicate claims, not as a means to prevail by mere attrition. This injustice should be 
overturned. 
CONCLLUSIION 
For the foregoing reasons, Tifani and Jared Wattenbarger respectfully requests that the 
district court's order be overturned and remanded to apply the summa~y judgment standard of 
review and the correct interpretation of the arbitration clause, or alternatively that as a matter of 
law that Wattenbargers' claims are not within the scope ofthe arbitration provision or that the 
arbitration provision is invalid for public policy reasons. 
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